Abstract
The possibility to conclude co-decision already by its first reading was introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 in order to speed up inter-institutional decision-making. Early agreements, however, have implications beyond efficiency gains. Compromises are negotiated in informal settings and imply an additional level in the delegation chain of EU policy making, where the Council presidency and the rapporteur for the European Parliament become the entrusted negotiators (Shackleton & Raunio 2003; Farrel & Héritier 2004; Rasmussen & Shackleton 2005; Rasmussen 2011 ). Such turn towards greater informalization of the EU decisionmaking process is likely to have considerable implications for national parliaments' ability to scrutinize and influence EU affairs. By adding another level to the delegation chain, national parliaments face increased risk of information asymmetries and possible agency loss (Auel 2007) .
The research aim of this paper is to explore the implications of EU early agreements for national parliaments' ability to scrutinize their executives' decision-making in EU affairs.
In order to follow this research aim, a mixed method approach will be used. Survey data on national parliaments' scrutiny process and response to early agreements have been collected for 2 and combined with case study examination of national parliaments in Denmark, United
Kingdom (UK) and Germany, comparing scrutiny grounds on a set of parameters. The paper first examines how decision-making has been accelerated in the EU and suggests more general implications. The burgeoning research agenda on EU timescapes is applied. The research design and data is then presented. Subsequently, the survey analysis on national parliaments and early agreements is conducted, followed by the three case studies. Finally some concluding remarks are provided.
Out of time?: National Parliaments and Early Decision-making in the EU
Early agreements demonstrate how the EU timescape, defined as 'the manner in which political time in the EU is institutionalized along the dimensions of polity, politics and public policy' (Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2009: 325 , for the research agenda on timescapes see in particular Goetz and Meyer-Sahling 2009; Goetz 2009; Meyer-Sahling and Goetz 2009 ), for decision-making has been profoundly changed during the last decade. The timescape of supranational governance has proved to work efficiently (Maurer 2003) . Efficiency has been secured by formal institutional amendments and 'informal institutional turns in shared decision-making' (Farrell & Héritier 2004 : 1209 . The Amsterdam Treaty amended the co-decision procedure and hereby the temporal rules that governed decision-making and thus interaction. Since 1999, it has thus been possible to adopt proposals after the first reading in the EP and the Council (Rasmussen & Shackleton 2005) .
As Farrell and Héritier point out, this amendment of the co-decision procedure introduced an important innovation by means of 'early agreements', making it possible to fast-track proposals and avoid a second reading or conciliation (Farrell & Héritier 2004 ). Early agreements are made possible by informal trialogues in which key actors from the Council and the EP meet regularly and gradually form the contours of a compromise together with the Commission before formal political positions are taken by national ministers and MEPs. Scholars have pointed out these trialogues to have considerable implications for democratic legitimacy:
"The trilogue is the biggest challenge to democratic legitimacy, for it centralises power in those actors who represents the Council and the Parliament in the trilogue" (Chalmers et. al. 2006: 155) .
The frequency of fast-tracked EU decision-making has increased considerable, as demonstrated in From being a procedure applied to technical and less controversial proposals (Farrell & Heritier 2004 : 1197 , early agreements have grown to be the dominant decision mode of co-legislation and is increasingly applied to controversial and important proposals (House of Lords, 2008-09: 12) . In the legislative year 2008-2009, 80 % of all co-decision dossiers were concluded at 1 st reading.
Early agreements mean efficiency gains, but they also have considerable consequences for the legislative process and likely to have implications for the 'dual legitimacy' of EU decision making (Benz 2004; Töller 2006) . The decision mode has decisive consequences for the EU institutions involved, implying de facto decisions being negotiated, detailed and prepared by a smaller set of key actors; the rapporteur and eventually shadow rapporteurs in the EP, the Council presidency and sometimes mediated by the Commission officials. As Farrell and Héritier point out, the decision mode clearly empowers a selected set of actors, allowing the EP rapporteur and the Council presidency to command their own sets of information, exchange views, build reciprocal trust and thus accelerate decision making (Farrell & Héritier 2004 : 1200 -1204 .
In order to conclude a dossier by its first reading, negotiations will begin as soon as the Commission has presented its proposal (Rasmussen 2011: 43 ). An informal trialogue meeting is held when the EP has appointed its rapporteur and the Council working group has had a first look at the text. This meeting will be followed by others, in which the representatives will report back to their institutions on the progression in the discussion. When the vote in the relevant parliamentary committee approaches, the representatives will begin to exchange compromise texts (Farrell and Hertier 2004: 1198) . If the representatives can reach an informal compromise, the EP can include the Council's position in its first reading amendments and the Council can later adopt the proposal as amended by the EP (Reh et. al. 2013 forthcoming) . However, as the informal negotiations unfold and disagreements are gradually closed, it becomes increasingly difficult for the formal arenas such as Coreper or the parliamentary committee to reopen the negotiations as this will imply that all the prepared details are up in the air again. The final stagewhere the compromise text is presented to the Council of Ministers and voted on in the plenary of the EP -will generally simply approve what has been put in place long time before.
Over the years, the institutional familiarity with the co-decision procedure has increased and the The dense and early contact between the institutional representatives is foremost an informal one, which makes it difficult for the non-involved to size up how far negotiations have developed (ibid.). However, informal decision-making seems to be preferred by both legislators. The EP has greater ability to influence the compromise negotiated when put together in close contact with far fewer Council actors .The Council has its own motivations to prefer to close a deal early. In a Council with 27 member states it has become increasingly difficult to find a common position, 
Research design and data
This paper utilises a mixed-method strategy by combining survey data and three case studies (Lieberman 2005) . The survey provides a descriptive chart on how national parliaments are involved in pre-legislation and early decision making, how they scrutinise, and the resources available for scrutiny. The data has been gathered via an online survey conducted in late 2009 and early 2010. The survey questions were derived from the existing corpus of literature; through reports compiled by the COSAC and on the basis of explorative interviews with parliamentarians and staff working in the field. Before the survey was officially sent out, it was tested on a group of people with expertise in data collection and/or parliamentary control. The survey was then sent via e-mails addressed personally to the academic secretary of the European Affairs Committees (EAC) in the respective national parliaments of the EU-27 using the COSAC network contact information. 6 In the vast majority of cases the academic secretary of the EAC is the respondent. A total of 39 surveys were sent out, 37 of which were answered. Up to four reminders were sent to those who had not yet replied to the survey, which increased the response rate significantly. Data were ultimately collected for all of the parliaments with the exception of the two chambers of the Spanish legislature. Where possible, the data were later validated against indices derived from the COSAC reports and existing studies (i.e. Raunio & Hix 2000; Maurer & Wessels 2001; Raunio 2005) . After triangulation, the data were processed in a descriptive manner by automatically grouping parliaments that had provided the same answers and then aggregating the frequencies.
Based on the survey data we conducted three explorative cases studies on how the Danish, British and German parliaments scrutinise their respective governments. The three parliaments display considerable variation on the abovementioned dimension and they score differently in the scrutiny level assessment by Raunio; Denmark ranked highest, Germany in between and the UK ranked as a relatively weak scrutiny model (Raunio 2005: 335) . Moreover, they are representatives of the 'majoritarian' and 'consensual' government configuration (Lijphart 1999 
Early agreements: National parliaments left out?
According to the survey data, most national parliaments are not involved in early agreements. For this reason, they have no information on and cannot control the drifts of the EU decision making taking place in this fast-track form. The chambers of parliaments which are labelled 'not informed' amounts to sixteen whereas three note that they are sometimes informed after agreements are made. In a secluded actor space, national parliamentarians represent a set of actors which are left out.
The decision mode is characterised by its own flow, whereas parliamentary scrutiny requires a temporal 'stand still', allowing control to be exerted. Informal contact and trialogues between the 
A call for early involvement. Accelerating national scrutiny?
Early decision making calls for the earlier involvement of national parliaments. As noted in the survey, '"real" negotiations are an exception once the proposal is on the This development also suggests that in order to be able to respond adequately at the earliest stage in the decision-making process, national parliaments would need to gain information before the Commission presents its proposal. This means that agenda-setting becomes an increasingly relevant part of the policy process for all actors seeking to influence or control the flow of EU affairs (Börzel 2002 (Börzel , 2005 Wallace 2005 We will now turn to the case studies of Denmark, the UK and Germany in order to inquire further into how their national parliaments have organised their scrutiny process and -eventuallyadapted to the new timescape characterizing EU decision-making.
Parliamentary scrutiny and early agreements: Denmark
Denmark is often held to be the member state in which the national parliament has the greatest power in EU affairs and been consider the 'scrutiny leader' (Raunio 2007 
Parliamentary scrutiny and early agreements: United Kingdom
In contrast to Denmark, the British parliamentary scrutiny system is not mandating the minister proposals which the Committee has not cleared or which are awaiting debate. Moreover, the committee may refer documents to departmental select committees, though the most common option is to refer the documents to one of the sub-committees on EU affairs. As the House of Commons apply a document based scrutiny system, the earliest stage at which it gets activated is when the Commission launch a Green or White paper (Survey question 16). However, the system is not animated before a formal proposal is placed on the table. The House of Commons should be informed before an early agreement is reached but it not in a position to instruct (Survey question 21).Initially, the House of Commons assumed that contentions proposals would not be subject to early agreements (Interview VI). This assumption, has however, been challenged as first reading agreements is prevalent and also used on proposals which are politically salient (Ibid.).
Early agreements thus challenge the scrutiny system due to the fast speed and the opaque nature of the decision mode which makes it difficult to apply the scrutiny reserve. The House of
Commons have informed the government about the difficulty but no concrete measures have been installed to better synchronize the European and the national timescape (Ibid.).
The House of Lords, which is the unelected, second chamber of the UK parliament, exercises control via its EU Committee. Every week, the committee chair and legal adviser sift through all of the documents which the government has deposed (Interview V). Approximately half of the cases of a routine nature are cleared by the committee chair, meaning that the government can go ahead and decide on them. The other dossiers, which raise political or legal questions, are allocated to one of the seven sub-committees under the select committee. The subcommittees meet weekly, where a background note will be prepared for each case by a committee clerk (Ibid).
Committee clerks will also prepare a draft letter for the minister if something must be clarified before the committee can lift the scrutiny reserve. Based on the information provided by the minister, the committee will decide whether to clear the proposal or to investigate further by inviting the minister to provide evidence before the committee (Cygan 2007: 169-171) . Before the minister arrives at the session, committee clerks and specialists will have prepared a number of questions, which are divided between the members. In cases of greater significance, the committee will produce a report. 
Parliamentary scrutiny and early agreements: Germany
Like the British system, and in contrast to the Danish system, the German system is a document based system in which proposals from the EU institutions are singled out for scrutiny (COSAC 2007: 15) . The German Parliament has been criticized for not making full use of its formal rights to scrutinize the government and thus to perform relatively weakly compared to other models (Auel 2007: 493; Töller 2004; Sprungk 2010) .
The Committee on the Affairs of the European Union (Ausschuss für die Angelegenheiten der
Europäischen Union), also called the EU Committee, is the hub of coordination in the Bundestag.
The committee is responsible for cases concerning European integration, whereas the specialised committees are responsible for scrutinizing sector specific proposals from the EU. All documents from the government go through the EU Committee, which is allocating them to relevant committees (Interview VIII). The transmitted documents have attached forwarding letters with information on the main substance, the legal basis, the applicable procedure and the leading federal ministry (EUZBBG section 5). A special administrative unit under the auspices of the EU committee called PA1 (Europa Referat) sifts the documents and suggests a prioritisation to the parliamentary groups (Interview VIII).
The prioritised dossiers will then together with the political groups be allocated to the special committee(s) of the Bundestag which the case concerns. The responsible committee(s) will make use of questions to the government, together with written reports, as the basis for its scrutiny before crafting a resolution. The EU Committee can suggest amendments or adjust the resolution from the lead committee before transmitting it to the plenary (Rules of Procedure: Rule 93b (7)).
Based on the resolution the plenary adopts a motion, which the federal government must follow in the Council of Ministers (EUZBBG section 9). However, the government can deviate from that motion for compelling reasons, in which case it will have to appear before relevant committee in 
Conclusion
Co-decision is now the ordinary legislative mode in a European Union enlarged to 27 member states. Scholars have noted that neither the increased powers of the EP, nor enlargement have slowed down supranational decision-making, which seems to operate according to 'business as usual' (Wallace 2007; Meyer-Sahling and Goetz 2009: 329) . This is, however, not the case. The accelerated and growing informalization of decision-making has wide implications beyond timeestimated performance. Performance by means of efficiency may be largely intact, but the distribution of power and democratic legitimacy are not. The analysis in this paper has demonstrated how EU early agreements have considerable implications for national parliaments' ability to scrutinize their executives.
EU decision-making and the national scrutiny hereof operate in many cases according to different, desynchronized timescapes. It has been pointed out that 'EU institutions do not run the same clock' (Goetz 2009: 210) , but even less so is the political time shared with national political systems. The changes in the decision-mode upset national models of parliamentary scrutiny as they were institutionalized at a very different point in political time, where member states were fewer, the EP had much less power and decisions were normally taken on basis of consensus.
National executives were thus more directly responsible for their EU actions, whereas today many decisions are prepared and de facto taken on behalf of the large majority of national executives.
The minister may not be very well informed, now represented by the rotating presidency, acting on behalf of issued mandates to keep the pace of complex decision-making and close a deal as early as possible. The degree of closure in the informal setting may essentially sideline the object of control itself, i.e., the government.
The three case-studies point out that none of the scrutiny models are at pace with the accelerated EU decision-making. Nevertheless, important differences are evident, which may better enable the House of Lords in the UK system to tackle the increased need for early action. When comparing the scrutiny process on different parameters, the House of Lords stands out as the more pro-active chamber: The Lords treat a limited, selected number of cases but subsequently invest significantly greater resources in the scrutiny process and carry out much more detailed examination. Furthermore, their grounds for scrutiny do not depend on explanatory memorandums or summary notes from the government, operating instead on the basis of their own reports or notes worked out by their own employees. Thus, the independent analytical capacity is higher. Moreover, the high involvement of special committees enhances the scrutiny capacity of the House of Lords. The
Lords proactively attempt to influence both the Commission and the EP by scrutinising developments and initiatives and sending their own reports to the agenda-setters in the Commission and the decision makers in the EP, among these the powerful rapporteurs. In this manner, the House of Lords appears to have adapted to the increased need for early action in the EU policy cycle. In contrast the EAC in Denmark continues to concentrate on the late stage of decision making where a mandate is given to the minister. Although Denmark is renowned for its strong model of parliamentary control, it lags behind in its efforts to adapt to the new temporal rules of EU decision-making. Germany as well has not yet accelerated its national scrutiny, and experience a lack of information on position formation in the informal trialogues. So far no infrastructure has been put in place which is synchronised with fast track decision making at the European level.
This paper has examined the implications of early agreements in EU decision-making for the national legislators' ability to scrutinize their executives. The temporal rules that govern EU politics have changed (Goetz 2009 ), but many national clocks have far from adapted and are out of time. Whereas the performance of the system may be intact, the implications for power and democratic legitimacy stand out. Concerning the distribution of power, these findings gives evidence to 'de-parliamentation thesis'. More than half of the national legislator has lost power, but this time not to the executive (Goetz 2000; Wessels et al. 2003; Raunio 2006) , but instead to the few actors of delegated responsibility. Concerning democratic legitimacy, the findings suggest that the 'dual legitimacy' of EU politics (Benz 2004; Töller 2006 ) is more challenged than often assumed.
